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The UK’s PPE procurement scandal reminds us why we need ways
to hold ministers to account
Martin McKee looks at what lessons we can learn from the government’s many failures in procuring
personal protective equipment during the pandemic
Martin McKee professor of European public health
It is never easy to explain, to someone fromelsewhere
who is unfamiliarwith the constitutional settlement,
how politicians are held to account in the UK. There
is nowritten constitution constrainingwhatministers
can do. They can bypass parliament altogether by
means of the royal prerogative. The composition of
the House of Commons is wildly out of alignment
with the share of votes of the political parties
represented in it. And the unelected House of Lords
includes some members who are there because of
something their long dead ancestors did or because
they hold positions in the established church.
It is hardly surprising that this so often leads to laws
and policies that are unintelligible. As three judges,
wrestlingwith the 2003Criminal JusticeAct, famously
declared, “The most inviting course for this court to
follow would be for its members, having shaken their
heads in despair, to holdup their hands and say: ‘the
holy grail of rational interpretation is impossible to
find.’” Indeed, the UK’s legislative process is so
dysfunctional that it has generated enough examples
to fill a book entitled The Blunders of Our
Governments.
Yet even in this arcane system there are some
fundamental principles, of which perhaps the most
important is the rule of law. Ministers cannot simply
do what they want because it is expedient. As Prime
Minister Boris Johnson discovered, you cannot ask
the Queen to do something that is illegal, reminding
us of the famous quotation from the late Lord
Denning, citing an earlier jurist, “Be yenever so high,
the law is above you.” Of course, ministers don’t like
being constrained and they have been working hard
to be free of the inconvenience of judicial review.
Fortunately, they have so far not managed to do so.
Health secretary Matt Hancock has just been
reminded of this principle in a damning judgment in
the High Court. Early in the pandemic, the
government was faced with a crisis. The amount of
personal protective equipment (PPE) available to the
NHS and, even more so, social care providers, was
inadequate. There was a global scramble to buy up
supplies and a real danger that the UK would be left
behind.
Public procurement, the spending of government
money to purchase goods and services, is subject to
strict rules. These are set out in European Union
directives. The basic principles are that the process
should be transparent and it should deliver value for
money. The purchaser should say what they want,
in an invitation to tender. Anyone who thinks they
canprovidewhat iswanted canmake anoffer, saying
what they can provide and at what price. These rules
do allow considerable flexibility. For example, they
recognise that the purchaser may not know exactly
what they want and the provider may have some
clever ideas that the purchaser has not thought of.
Consequently, the legislation allows for a number of
alternative processes, such as competitive dialogues
and innovationpartnerships. It also allows for special
procedures in an emergency, with contracts being
agreed without prior publication of the call for
tenders. But this is not a free rein. Those who are
seeking to purchase thingsmust show that theyhave
accepted themost economically advantageous offer,
although this does not just mean the cheapest, as it
can take into account things like the ability to deliver
rapidly. But above all, they must publish details of
all contracts within 30 days of them being awarded
so that others can scrutinise what has been agreed.
And this is what Matt Hancock did not do.
The struggles that patient facing health and social
careworkers facedwhen trying to obtainPPEarewell
known, although seemingly not to the health
secretary when he told the BBC that there had been
no national shortage. Some of the best accounts are
in books by two British doctors, Rachel Clarke and
Dominic Pimenta. Indeed, Pimenta stepped away
from medicine to create a charity to source PPE for
the NHS.
Yet equally shocking were the stories of how the
procurementprocesswasoperated. Inoneof themost
visible cases, only a fraction of 400 000 gowns
ordered from a Turkish t shirt manufacturer arrived.
When theydid arrive theywere late, despite theRoyal
Air Force being sent to collect them, and they were
found to be unusable. Fifty million face masks,
purchased through a company specialising in
currency trading and offshore property, part of a
£252m (€291m; $348m) contract,were also unusable.
A Miami jewellery designer, awarded a £250m
contract for PPE, was found to have paid £21m to a
consultant to broker thedeal. Apest control company
withnet assets of £19 000was given a£108mcontract
for PPE. A highly critical report by the National Audit
Office provides more examples.
These vast sums of money were being spent as
schools andcommunity groupswereusing their spare
time to make PPE using their 3D printers. Then there
have been other concerns, including the use of “VIP
lanes” allowing some providers direct access to
government, and the role of what has been termed
the “chumocracy,” whereby those with political
connections seemed especially privileged.
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The government’s defence of its actions is that it was faced with an
emergency and, in the circumstances, it was inevitable that
problems would arise. What counted was that PPE was obtained.
Yet it is clear that a lot of what was procured was unusable. The
government also bought far more than was needed, without
considering how it would distribute it. As a consequence, the port
of Felixstowe, through which a large share of the country’s imports
pass, was blocked with 11 000 containers of PPE just as it was
struggling to implement new Brexit related processes. Meanwhile,
companies that did have expertise and capacity were ignored and
patient facing health and social care workers were making their
own PPE out of bin liners.
So what are the lessons we can learn? Most obviously, this saga has
revealed problems with the UK’s preparedness and procurement
ability. But the lessons go much further.
Firstly, the judicial review was initiated by the Good Law Project,
an organisation founded by the barrister Jo Maugham, along with
three members of parliament. Maugham could be considered one
of the “activist lawyers” that someministers have criticised inwords
that some consider undermine the rule of law. Yet, as this example
shows, they play a crucial role in holding ministers to account.
Secondly, as noted earlier, the government has been seeking to
limit the scope of judicial review. It must not be allowed to succeed.
Finally, the existing rules on public procurement have sufficient
flexibility for emergencies. Yet, likemanyother provisions inherited
from the UK’s EU membership, the government has expressed a
wish to diverge or, as the prime minister put it, “fundamentally
change” them.Given the evidence of abuses, andnot just in relation
to PPE, this is something we should be concerned about.
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